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I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, the government agency that
regulates the activities of national banks is not funded by
individual taxpayers.! In fact, nearly all of the fees and
assessments that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) collects to fund its operations come from the federally
chartered banks that it regulates.2 Some critics call this a conflict
of interest that makes the OCC a puppet of national banks used to
promulgate regulations to evade state consumer protection laws
and lessen competitive equality with state banks.3 Indeed, such
regulations often have the force to preempt inconsistent state
banking and consumer protection laws under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.4 In response, state financial regulators
and attorneys general have in recent years contested OCC's
preemptive regulations but have been subjected to litigation when
attempting to enforce state banking and consumer protection
laws.5 Litigation has involved both the extent of the OCC's
1. See OCC, About the OCC, http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last
visited Jan. 7, 2010) ("The OCC does not receive any appropriations from Congress.
Instead, its operations are funded primarily by assessments on national banks.
National banks pay for their examinations, and ... for the OCC's processing of their
corporate applications. The OCC also receives revenue from its investment income,
primarily from U.S. Treasury securities.").
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 363-64 (2004)
[hereinafter Serious Threat].
4. "[Flederal preemption" is "[t]he principle (derived from the Supremacy
Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or
regulation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (8th ed. 2004); see also infra note 33
(discussing the three types of state law preemption).
5. See generally Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd in part and vacated in part, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (involving suit against New York State's
attorney general); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich.
2004), affid, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005), affd, 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (involving suit
against Michigan's Office of Insurance and Financial Services Commissioner);
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"visitorial powers ' '6 over national banks under the National Bank
Act (NBA) and how much deference courts should generally give
to the OCC's interpretations of the NBA.7
Two factors can determine the preemptive impact of an
OCC regulation or an interpretation of the NBA - its impact on
federalism and the clarity of the interpreted statutory provision.8
The Supreme Court has alternately considered each of these issues
without definitively reconciling them.9 Prior to 2007, the Court
consistently granted Chevron deference to the OCC's
interpretations of the NBA.'0 Granting a federal agency Chevron
deference means allowing an agency's interpretation of a federal
Preemption of State Regulation of National Banks: Hearing on Congressional Review
of OCC Preemption Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, H. Comm.
on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 3 (2004) (statement of Diana L. Taylor, N.Y.
Superintendent of Banks, on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors)
("The OCC's new regulations usurp the powers of the Congress, stifle state efforts to
protect their citizens, and threaten not only the dual banking system but also public
confidence in our financial services industry."); infra Part II (describing the OCC's
2004 preemption rules).
6. A general definition of "visitorial power" is "[t]he power to inspect or make
decisions about an entity's operations." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1209 (8th ed.
2004). In Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, the meaning of the phrase "visitorial
powers" in NBA statute 12 U.S.C. § 484 was at issue. Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009); see infra pp. 484-90 and note 110.
7. See generally Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 394 F. Supp. 2d 620 (deciding
whether New York State's attorney general could enforce the Fair Housing Act
against national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)); Wachovia Bank, N.A., 334 F. Supp.
2d 957 (deciding whether an OCC regulation preempts a Michigan law that would
require a national bank operating subsidiary to register with the State, making the
subsidiary subject to state visitation).
8. See generally Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (addressing both the clarity of the
relevant NBA "visitorial powers" statute and the federalism concerns arising from an
OCC interpretation of it); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the federalism concerns surrounding a
preemptive OCC regulation relating to national bank operating subsidiaries).
9. Compare Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (ruling not to uphold an OCC regulation
that would prohibit states from enforcing their non-preempted state banking laws
against national banks), with Watters, 550 U.S. 1 (upholding an OCC regulation that
would preempt state licensing and registration laws from applying to national bank
operating subsidiaries).
10. See generally Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (upholding
the OCC's interpretation of the word "interest" in 12 U.S.C. § 85); NationsBank of
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (upholding the
OCC's characterization of annuities as investment products rather than insurance);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. et al., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(establishing the Chevron analysis). Cf. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (using Chevron
analysis, but ruling against the OCC); Watters, 550 U.S. 1 (ruling in favor of an OCC
interpretation, but without using Chevron analysis).
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statute to prevail when it is either consistent with Congress's
"clear" intent in the statute (referred to as "Step One"), or if
Congress's intent is not clear and the statute is ambiguous, when
the agency's interpretation is based on a "permissible construction
of the statute" (referred to as "Step Two")." Once granted
deference under either Step One or Step Two, an agency's
interpretation of a federal statute can preempt state law.12 Since
the enactment of the OCC's final preemption rules in 2004 and the
subsequent Supreme Court rulings in Watters v. Wachovia Bank
3
and Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n,1 4 Chevron continues to be the
test to apply in cases involving OCC interpretations of NBA
statutes. 5 However, the test is now applied less deferentially when
federalism implications are of greater concern.16
11. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council involved the Environmental Protection Agency's construction of a
term in the Clean Air Act that was not "explicitly defined" by Congress and not
specifically addressed in the Act's legislative history. Id. at 837. The Court, through
Justice Stevens, established a test to be applied in situations where a federal agency
makes a determination on the meaning of ambiguous language in a federal statute.
See id. at 842-43. The two-step framework was described by the Court as follows:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43. The Court ultimately held that "[t]he EPA's ...definition is a
permissible construction of the statutory term[.]" Id.
12. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737,
738-40 (2004); infra Part II. See also definition of "federal preemption" supra note 4.
13. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
14. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV. Compare Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2720 ("We have not
invoked the presumption against pre-emption, and think it unnecessary to do so in
giving force to the plain terms of the National Bank Act. Neither, however, should
the incursion that the Comptroller's regulation makes upon traditional state powers
be minimized."), with Watters, 550 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if the
OCC did intend its regulation to pre-empt the state laws at issue here, it would still
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This Comment will trace the evolution of the Supreme
Court's Chevron jurisprudence with respect to cases involving
OCC interpretations of NBA provisions, and it will consider the
effects of federalism concerns on how Chevron is applied. First,
the Comment will provide some background on the preemption of
state banking laws in Part II and briefly describe the OCC's 2004
final preemption rules. 7 Then, Part III of the Comment will
explore two Supreme Court cases decided before the issuance of
these rules and two decided after, with an emphasis on the most
recent case, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n. Finally, Part IV will
further discuss Cuomo to understand where Chevron analysis
presently stands as it relates to the OCC.'9
II. THE OCC's FINAL PREEMPTION RULES
In 1996, the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson2° decided whether a federal statute that permits
national banks to sell insurance in small towns preempts a Florida
statute that prohibited the practice.2 Chevron did not apply in this
case, because the dispute did not involve a federal agency's
interpretation of a federal statute.22 Instead, the Court applied
what it called "ordinary legal principles of preemption" in ruling
that the federal statute preempts the conflicting Florida law.23 A
key aspect of these "principles of preemption" is that states should
not merit Chevron deference. No case from this Court has ever applied such a
deferential standard to an agency decision that could so easily disrupt the federal-
state balance."); but cf Thomas W. Merrill, Cuomo v. Clearing House: Why We Are
Still in the Dark about Agency Preemption, LOMBARD STREET, Aug. 17, 2009, at 22,
http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/why-we-are-still-in-the-dark ("[TIhe
Court seemed poised to clarify what role Chevron should play in resolving
preemption disputes ... [njevertheless, in the wake of these decisions we have no
clearer idea about how Chevron fits into [the] preemption picture than we did
before."); Case Comment, Preemption of State Law Enforcement, 123 HARV. L. REV.
322, 323 (2009) [hereinafter Preemption of State Law Enforcement] (arguing that the
Cuomo Court's consideration of "functional federalism concerns ... would have
clarified the Court's Chevron jurisprudence for future cases.").
17. See infra Part II, pp. 470-73.
18. See infra Part III, pp. 473-90.
19. See infra Part IV, pp. 490-94.
20. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
21. Id., 517 U.S. at 27.
22. See id. at 27.
23. Id. at 37.
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have the ability to regulate national banks insofar as their
regulations do not "prevent or significantly interfere with" the
exercise of national bank powers under the NBA.24 The Court
qualified this by adding that "[l]egislative grants of both
enumerated and incidental 'powers' to national banks historically
have been interpreted as grants of authority not normally limited
by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.,
25
Furthermore, the Court explained, when the NBA has not
"expressly conditioned" a national bank power on a state's
approval or permission, then the Court has typically found no
condition or limitation on the exercise of the national bank
26power.
The language used by the Court in Barnett Bank to clarify
the preemptive force of the NBA gave the OCC some firm
21grounding for new regulations. In 2004, in an effort to clarify its
authority over national banks under the NBA, the OCC issued two
final regulations: one concerning its ability to preempt state laws
("preemption rule") and another clarifying its visitorial powers
over national banks ("visitorial powers rule"). 28 The preemption
rule was adopted "to specify the types of state laws that [do and]
do not apply to national banks' lending and deposit taking
activities., 29  Under the new regulations, the OCC repeatedly
stated that unless federal law makes an exception, "state laws that
obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully
exercise its powers" would not apply to national banks.30 This
language stands in contrast to the language used in Barnett Bank-
that States should not be impeded in their attempts to regulate
national banks if their regulations do not "prevent or significantly
24. Id. at 33.
25. Id. at 32.
26. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34 (1996).
27. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000, 7.4007, 7.4008, 7.4009, 34.4 (2009).
28. See Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) ("visitorial powers rule"); Bank Activities and
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34) ("preemption rule").
29. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1904.
30. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000, 7.4007, 7.4008, 7.4009, 34.4.
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interfere with" the exercise of national banks' powers.3' The OCC
justified the lower bar of "obstruct, impair, or condition" in its
regulations by arguing that the Court used "a variety of
formulations" in Barnett Bank to describe when state laws should
not apply, and these formulations "defeat[] any suggestion that
any one phrase constitutes the exclusive standard of
preemption. 32  The OCC also insisted that the preemption rule
did not amount to "field preemption," as does the Office of Thrift
Supervision's (OTS) lending regulation.33
The second 2004 regulation, the visitorial powers rule,
clarifies "the scope of the OCC's visitorial powers" and places
limitations on states' abilities to enforce their laws against national
banks.34 Under the visitorial powers rule, the OCC interprets a
statute in the NBA to give itself "exclusive power to inspect,
examine, supervise, and regulate the business activities of national
banks," in addition to having the exclusive power to enforce state
laws against national banks.35 Thus, the visitorial powers rule
31. See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A, 517 U.S. at 33.
32. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1910.
33. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1911 ("[W]e decline to adopt the suggestion ... that we declare that these
regulations 'occupy the field' of national banks' real estate lending, other lending,
and deposit-taking activities."). The preemption rule provides a description of the
three different types of preemption, including "field preemption":
State laws are preempted by Federal law, and thus rendered invalid with
respect to national banks, by operation of the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court has identified three ways in
which this may occur. First, Congress can adopt express language
setting forth the existence and scope of preemption. Second, Congress
can adopt a framework for regulation that "occupies the field" and
leaves no room for states to adopt supplemental laws. Third,
preemption may be found when state law actually conflicts with
Federal law. Conflict will be found when either: (i) compliance with
both laws is a "physical impossibility;" or (ii) when the state law stands
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
Id. at 1910 (citations omitted). See also 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2009) ("[The OTS]
occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations.").
34. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
35. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-387, OCC PREEMPTION
RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS 1 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009)
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suggests that even if a state law is not preempted under the
preemption rule, enforcement of that state law will lie exclusively
with the OCC. 6 Indeed, the OCC made the point that the new
regulations would not preempt substantive state laws but would
"clarify the appropriate agency for enforcing those state laws that
are applicable to national banks. 3 7 Considering what appeared to
be the OCC's expansion of its visitorial powers at the expense of
states being able to enforce their own banking laws and
regulations against national banks, the visitorial powers rule
became a point of contention in Cuomo.
38
III. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND THE OCC
The cases presented trace the evolution of the Supreme
Court's granting of Chevron deference to the OCC, culminating in
the most recent case, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n.39 In
Cuomo, for the first time, the Court did not find the OCC's
construction of ambiguous statutory language to be permissible
under Chevron.4°
A. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Life Insurance
Co. (VALIC)
41
In 1995, the Supreme Court in VALIC upheld the OCC's
interpretation of the NBA that would allow NationsBank tobroke " ° 42
broker annuities. VALIC made two main arguments in its effort
43to bar national banks from brokering annuities. The first was
that the OCC's interpretation of a provision in the NBA that
describes national bank powers was "contrary to the clear intent of
(interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006)); but see Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n,
L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (holding that the OCC does not have exclusive power
to enforce non-preempted state banking laws against national banks).
36. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000; Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900.
37. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1896.
38. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2710, 2715.
39. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
40. See id.
41. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995). Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Id.
42. Id. at 264.
43. Id. at 257-58, 260-61.
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Congress." 44 Second, VALIC argued that annuities are a type of
insurance and, therefore, should be regulated under an NBA
provision placing limitations on national bank insurance
activities. The Court framed the Chevron analysis for
determining whether the OCC's interpretation of the NBA should
be given deference as follows:
[W]hen we confront an expert administrator's
statutory exposition, we inquire first whether "the
intent of Congress is clear" as to "the precise
question at issue." If so, "that is the end of the
matter." But "if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute." If the
administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term
in a way that is reasonable in light of the
legislature's revealed design, we give the
administrator's judgment "controlling weight. 46
In VALIC, the Court first decided that the OCC's
interpretation of the NBA statute was "in accord with the
legislature's intent, that 'the business of banking'. . . covers
brokerage of financial investment instruments., 47 Then, the Court
deferred to the OCC's judgment that annuities are "financial
investment instruments" and not a type of insurance covered by
the NBA statute.48 Both conclusions were reached by applying
44. Id. at 257-58 (referring to the OCC's interpretation of national bank powers
under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
45. Id. at 260-61 (referring to the NBA provision 12 U.S.C. § 92).
46. Id. at 257 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. et al.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
47. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
258-59 (1995) ("The second sentence of § 24 Seventh, in limiting banks' 'dealing in
securities,' presupposes that banks have authority not circumscribed by the five
specifically listed activities."); see also 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006) ("The business
of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited to purchasing and
selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own account[.]").
48. See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2006); Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at 263-64
("The Comptroller's classification of annuities, based on the tax deferral and
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Chevron's Step Two to find that the OCC's statutory construction
was reasonable in light of congressional intent and should be given
controlling weight.49  Thus, the Court readily granted Chevron
deference to the OCC to allow national banks to expand their
activities to include fixed and variable annuities.0
VALIC did not involve the preemption of a state law on
annuity sales by national banks.' Nevertheless, the Court's
characterization of annuities as financial investment instruments
subsequently had a preemptive effect on a Texas Insurance Code
provision that regulated annuities as insurance products and
prohibited banks from selling them.52 Surely, the Court was aware
that its decision could have a preemptive effect on some state laws,
yet it was not deterred from granting Chevron deference to the
OCC in VALIC. 3  No federalism concerns arising from such
preemptive effects were addressed by the Court. 4  By negative
implication, states' inability to regulate annuities as insurance for
investment features that distinguish them from insurance, in short, is at least
reasonable.").
49. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at 257-64 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-44); see also U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001) (stating that "notice
and comment" rulemaking or other "administrative formality" is not required in
order to consider granting Chevron deference).
50. See Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at 262-64 ("The Comptroller has
concluded that the federal regime is best served by classifying annuities according to
their functional characteristics. Congress has not ruled out that course; courts,
therefore, have no cause to dictate to the Comptroller the state-law constraint
VALIC espouses." (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842)).
51. See Serious Threat, supra note 3, at 293 ("OCC's ruling did not contain a
preemptive determination and was not offered as a justification for overriding state
law. Accordingly, VALIC simply did not address the question of whether an OCC
ruling should receive Chevron deference when the ruling either contains, or is used to
support, a preemption claim.").
52. Texas Bankers Ass'n v. Bomer, No. A-96-CA-694 JN, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13422, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1997) ("In conclusion, the National Bank Act grants
federal authority for national banks to sell annuities. Under the Supremacy Clause,
state statutes that prohibit banks from acting as agents in the sale of annuities are
preempted. . . . Accordingly, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) preempts the relevant
provisions of the Texas Insurance Code.")
53. Professor Arthur Wilmarth argues that "deference granted to the OCC by the
Supreme Court in VALIC has encouraged lower courts in subsequent cases to accept
the OCC's interpretations of the 'incidental powers' of national banks," as described
in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Serious Threat, supra note 3, at 289 n. 260. These
federal district and circuit court decisions, "have generally deferred to the OCC
under step two of Chevron unless another federal statute clearly indicates that the
OCC lacks authority to approve the activity in question." Id.
54. See Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at 254-64.
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the purpose of prohibiting or conditioning annuity brokerage by
national banks would not adversely affect the balance of
regulatory power between the states and the OCC.5  The
following case involves a statutory interpretation of the NBA
where federalism concerns are potentially greater and where
actual preemption of a state law results from the decision.
B. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota)1
6
In the 1996 opinion, Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),57
the NBA statute at issue permits a national bank to charge interest
at the rate allowed by the state where the national bank is
located. 8 The question presented in Smiley was "whether the
statutory term 'interest' encompasses late-payment fees."5 9 The
Court declared the meaning of the word "interest" to be
ambiguous and explained that it is its "practice to defer to the
reasonable judgments of agencies with regard to the meaning of
ambiguous terms in statutes they are charged with
administering. ' 6° It also explained why Chevron deference is given
in situations where there lies ambiguity:
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron,
not because of a presumption that they drafted the
provisions in question, or were present at the
hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but
rather because of a presumption that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by
55. See id.
56. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996). Justice Scalia authored
the opinion for a unanimous Court. Id.
57. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
58. Id. at 737; see also 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006) ("Any association may take, receive,
reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of
exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State, Territory, or District where the bank is located[.]") (emphasis added).
59. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 737.
60. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc. et al., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
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the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the
ambiguity allows.6'
The Court applied Chevron's Step Two to reach its
conclusion.62 It upheld as reasonable the OCC's regulation
interpreting the term "interest" in the statute to include late-
payment fees. 3 The Court elaborated somewhat on its Chevron
analysis in Smiley, stating that "arbitrary [or] capricious"
interpretations of the NBA or interpretations that are "manifestly
contrary to the statute" will not be entitled to Chevron deference.
64
But, even if the OCC took a particular position regarding the
meaning of an NBA statute in the past, a new regulatory position
taken in the future could still be entitled to deference. 65
In contrast to VALIC, the Smiley decision directly resulted
in the preemption of a state consumer protection law,66 but the
Court did not find a preemption issue.67 Rather, the Court
61. Id. at 740-41 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
62. Id. at 744-45 ("Since we have concluded that the Comptroller's regulation
deserves deference, the question before us is not whether it represents the best
interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one. The answer
is obviously yes."). Whereas in VALIC there was not an OCC interpretive
regulation, in Smiley there was one (the OCC regulation interpreting the word
"interest" in the statute was proposed after litigation had already begun and just
prior to the Court's hearing of the case), yet the Court used Chevron in both cases.
Compare Smiley, 517 U.S. at 741 ("Nor does it matter that the regulation was
prompted by litigation, including this very suit. Of course we deny deference to
agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or
administrative practice[.]" (citation and internal quotations omitted)), with
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257
(1995) (OCC arguing for its construction of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) on the basis of
its own interpretive letters).
63. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744-47 ("The definition of 'interest' that we ourselves set
out in Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177, 15 Wall. 177, 185, 21 L. Ed 128 (1873), decided
shortly after the National Bank Act, likewise contained no indication that it was
limited to charges expressed as a function of time or of amount of owing[.]").
64. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742; see also Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at
258 n.2 (making a similar point that "[t]he exercise of the Comptroller's discretion...
must be kept within reasonable bounds.").
65. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742.
66. Id. at 738 (stating that the California law against late-payment fees
preempted by the OCC's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 85 was a state consumer
protection law).
67. Id. at 744 ("[W]hether a statute is pre-emptive ... is not the question at issue
here; there is no doubt that § 85 pre-empts state law."(emphasis in original)). In
deciding whether a statute is preemptive, the Court said "[w]e may assume (without
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considered the case to be about the meaning of a word in a statute
already known to be preemptive and not about whether the statute
itself is preemptive. 68  Actually, the NBA statute at issue
specifically defers to state law; however, if the bank is "located"
(i.e. incorporated in) in a particular State, Territory, or District, it
may "export" the interest rate of that location to another state in
which it does business.6 9 Thus, the state law of one state could
have a preemptive effect on the state law of another state under
the NBA statute.7 ° But, the Court did not address the aspect of the
OCC's interpretation that would increase the "scope" of the
statute's preemption by including late-payment fees and
potentially other types of fees as "interest."71  Therefore, the
federalism question relating to the preemption of bank-fee-related
72consumer protection laws never truly arose. Professor Arthur
Wilmarth has argued that "[i]n summarily dismissing the
petitioner's Chevron argument, the Court in Smiley overlooked
the rather obvious fact that the OCC's regulation adopted a very
broad definition of 'interest,' thereby increasing the effective scope
of preemption[.] ' '73  Another critic has argued that the Court's
deciding) that the ... question must always be decided de novo by the courts."
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744. This means that if it were doubtful that a section of the NBA
was intended to preempt state law, then a court should perhaps not automatically
grant Chevron deference to the OCC on that question. See id.
68. See id. (stating that Petitioner's argument "confuses the question of the
substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a statute with the question of
whether a statute is pre-emptive."). The Court dismissed arguments in a prior case
before it "that the 'exportation' of interest rates from the bank's home State would
'significantly impair the ability of States to enact effective usury laws' with the
observation that 'this impairment ... has always been implicit in the structure of the
National Bank Act[.]"' Id. (citing Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of
Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1978)).
69. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006); Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 439 U.S. at
318-19.
70. See 12 U.S.C. § 85; Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 439 U.S. at 318-19.
71. See Serious Threat, supra note 3, at 294; cf. Federal Preemption -- Chevron
Deference -- Second Circuit Finds National Bank Operating Subsidiary Exempted
from State Law. -- Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d. Cir. 2005), 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1598, 1605 (2006) [hereinafter Federal Preemption] (arguing that "[s]uch
reasoning unwisely ignores probable congressional intent, besides creating an
interpretive discontinuity").
72. Though the Court did not frame the question in terms of a state's potential
inability to enforce state laws on late payment fees against national banks to protect
its residents, the obvious result takes power away from the states and grants it to the
OCC. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,743-44 (1996).
73. See Serious Threat, supra note 3, at 294.
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willingness to grant deference to the OCC so long as a statute itself
is clearly intended by Congress to preempt state law goes too far in
allowing the "agency to range far and wide from congressional
intent" relating to the actual "scope" of preemption. This
potential for overreaching by the OCC would have federalism
implications that the Court did not consider, manifesting itself in
the 2004 visitorial powers rule at issue in Cuomo.
75
In Watters, the Court was faced with a similar question to
those in VALIC and Smiley about ambiguous language in the
NBA that would result in the preemption of state auditing and
licensing laws related to mortgage lending, but the Court found
that Chevron was not essential to deciding the case.76
C. Watters v. Wachovia Bank
77
78
In the 2007 case, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, the issue was
whether a national bank's operating subsidiary conducting
mortgage lending activities should be subject to a state's auditing
and licensing requirements for mortgage lenders. 79  The Court
affirmed the judgment, but not the reasoning, of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals that ruled in favor of Wachovia Bank.80
The Sixth Circuit found, under Chevron's Step Two, that an
OCC regulation serves to resolve an ambiguity in the NBA
74. Federal Preemption, supra note 71, at 1605. The critic further explains:
[O]nce Congress makes express its desire to preempt state law, the scope of
that preemption suddenly widens to encompass any agency
interpretation that can satisfy the requirement of 'reasonableness....'
[U]nrestrained interpretation of a preemptive statute is equivalent to
unrestrained preemption; and thus Smiley's distinction, coupled with
Chevron deference, opens the door to sweeping preemption of state
law.
Federal Preemption, supra note 71, at 1605.
75. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009).
76. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20-21 (2007).
77. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). Justice Ginsburg wrote
the opinion for a five-three Court in which Justice Thomas took no part. Id.
78. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
79. Id. at 7. The state statute exempts national and state banks from its
requirements. Id. at 8.
80. See id. at 20-22; Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir.
2005), affd, 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
relating to states' "visitorial powers" over national bank operatingS • • 81
subsidiaries. Specifically, the circuit court reasoned that the
OCC's regulation, which asserts that "[s]tate laws apply to national
bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws
apply to the parent national bank," reflects "the eminently
reasonable conclusion that when a bank chooses to utilize the
authority it is granted under federal law, it ought not be hindered
by conflicting state regulations., 82 The Sixth Circuit held that the
regulation "reflect[s] a ... well-reasoned approach to preempting
state regulation of operating subsidiaries so as to avoid
interference with national banks' exercise of their powers ... and
their ability to use operating subsidiaries in the dynamic market of
bank and real estate lending." 83
Consequently, despite the absence in the NBA of an
express preemption of state laws concerning national bank
operating subsidiaries, the Sixth Circuit found the OCC's
regulation to be reasonable. 84 The circuit court explained that
national banks have been permitted to use operating subsidiaries
"for decades" to conduct business that the national banks
themselves could conduct.85  It appeared to view operating
subsidiaries as organizational units of national banks, not as
separate entities.86 Thus, by invoking the precedent in VALIC, the
circuit court granted Chevron deference to the OCC in its
interpretation of the NBA, allowing for the preemption of state
laws regulating national bank operating subsidiaries if those state
laws would be preempted for the parent national bank. The Sixth
81. Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d at 561. See infra note 110 (reproducing 12 U.S.C. §
484(a) (2006), the NBA's "visitorial powers" statute); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2009)
(describing the "[ajpplicability of State law to national bank operating subsidiaries").
82. Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d at 562 (citation omitted); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006.
83. Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d at 562 (citing Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d
305, 321 (2d Cir. 2005)).
84. Id. at 563.
85. Id. at 562 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 34, 788 (July 2, 2001) ("[Flor decades national
banks have been authorized to use the operating subsidiary as a convenient and
useful corporate form for conducting activities that the parent bank could conduct
directly.")).
86. See id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
87. See id. at 562 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)).
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Circuit did not reference Smiley in its opinion, though its Chevron
analysis was also consistent with that case.8
In affirming the Sixth Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he NBA is thus properly read by OCC to protect
from state hindrance a national bank's engagement in the 'business
of banking' whether conducted by the bank itself or by an
operating subsidiary, empowered to do only what the bank itself
could do."89  Yet, the Court found the question of Chevron
deference to be one of little practical importance, because the
OCC's regulation "merely clarifies and confirms what the NBA
already conveys." 9 The Court's avoidance of Chevron is unusual
because if a case can be decided under Chevron's Step One (where
the intent of Congress is "unambiguously expressed"), then the
NBA would not necessitate any clarification by an OCC
regulation.9' On the other hand, if the relevant NBA statutes are
ambiguous and require clarification, then Chevron's Step Two
should be applied. 92
Having set aside Chevron, the Court explained that
national banks' "authority to engage in the business of mortgage
lending comes from the NBA[,] . . . as does the authority to
conduct business through an operating subsidiary[,]" which is
allowed to engage in the same activities as the parent national
bank.93 It follows that operating subsidiaries can engage in the
88. Compare id. at 562 ("If the Comptroller's interpretation is reasonable, we
must defer to its construction of the statute."), with Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996) ("Since we have concluded that the Comptroller's
regulation deserves deference, the question before us is not whether it represents the
best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one.").
89. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007) (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2009).
91. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. et al., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
92. See id. at 843.
93. Watters, 550 U.S. at 21 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 24a(g)(3)(A), 371
(2006)). Essentially, the majority found that operating subsidiaries are alluded to by
implication under 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A), because "financial subsidiaries" defined
under this section do not include "a subsidiary that ... engages solely in activities that
national banks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted subject to the
same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national
banks." See 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A); Watters, 550 U.S. at 20-21. The dissent
maintained that "Congress itself has never authorized national banks to use
subsidiaries incorporated under state law to perform traditional banking functions[,]"
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business of mortgage or real estate lending in the same manner
that their national bank parents can.94 Because "real estate
lending, when conducted by a national bank, is immune from state
visitorial control[,]" 95 it follows that the NBA "vests visitorial
oversight [over operating subsidiaries conducting real estate
lending] in OCC, not state regulators." 96 The Court reached the
same conclusion as the Sixth Circuit by brushing away the
ambiguity in the NBA to find application of the "visitorial powers"
statute to the activities of national bank operating subsidiaries. 97
The dissent in Watters contended that the OCC's
justifications for adopting its regulation on operating subsidiaries
and that "the OCC's expansive interpretation of its authority" should not allow
preemption. Watters, 550 U.S. at 30-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Watters, 550 U.S. at 18 ("It was not material [in VALIC] that the
function qualifying as within 'the business of banking,' . . . was to be carried out not
by the bank itself, but by an operating subsidiary[.]"(citing 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh))); NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251 (1995).
95. Watters, 550 U.S. at 13. States' visitorial powers over national banks are
limited in the NBA under 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006). See infra note 110.
96. Watters, 550 U.S. at 21 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)).
97. See 12 U.S.C. § 484(a); Watters, 550 U.S. at 20-22; cf. Merrill, supra note 16, at
22 (finding it "untenable" that it was unnecessary to consider Chevron). Professor
Merrill made the point that:
[t]he proposition that a state-chartered subsidiary has the same status as its
national bank parent corporation for purposes of visitorial authority
was established by a regulation adopted by the OCC, not by the "Act
itself." So the Court, at least implicitly, had to determine whether this
regulatory equation of parent and sub was a reasonable interpretation
of the Act.
Merrill, supra note 16, at 22.
An interesting point about the majority opinion in Watters is its use of precedent.
The Court wrote, "[a] national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending
through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions as the
national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state
law." Watters 550 U.S. at 21 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25, 33-34; 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 24a(g)(3)(A), 371) (emphasis added). It is
notable that the Court cited Barnett Bank, referring to its own heightened threshold,
and not the language from the OCC's 2004 preemption rule of "obstruct, impair, or
condition." See id.; 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007, 7.4008, 7.4009, 34.4 (2009). The Watters
Court did not expressly adopt the OCC's language, which could potentially sweep
under it more state laws. See Watters 550 U.S. at 21; Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33-34.
This suggests that an argument made by the OCC that a particular non-preempted
state law should be preempted because it "conditions" the activity of a national bank
may not be enough to meet the "significantly interfere" bar set by Barnett Bank. See
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33-34.
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should not have been entitled to Chevron deference because the
regulation had serious federalism implications. 98 Justice Stevens
wrote for the dissent that "the primary advantage of maintaining
an operating subsidiary as a separate corporation is that it shields
the national bank from the operating subsidiaries' liabilities .... It
is about whether a state corporation can avoid complying with state
regulations, yet nevertheless take advantage of state laws insulating
its owners from liability."99 Moreover, "[i]t is especially troubling
that the Court so blithely pre-empts Michigan laws designed to
protect consumers. Consumer protection is quintessentially a
'field which the States have traditionally occupied[.]'""00
Perhaps one reason why the majority chose not to rely on
Chevron is because, as the dissent pointed out, the OCC regulation
determined the extent to which state laws apply to operating
subsidiaries even though the NBA never expressly mentions
operating subsidiaries. 1 Alternatively, the dissent explained that
"when an agency purports to decide the scope of federal pre-
emption, a healthy respect for state sovereignty calls for something
less than Chevron deference."' °2  Though the dissent and the
majority seemed to agree that Chevron did not apply, the dissent
was far more willing to give weight to federalism implications of.- 103
state law preemption.
98. See Watters, 550 U.S. at 41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if the OCC did
intend its regulation to pre-empt the state laws at issue here, it would still not merit
Chevron deference. No case from this Court has ever applied such a deferential
standard to an agency decision that could so easily disrupt the federal-state
balance."); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2009).
99. Watters, 550 U.S. at 43. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 35-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also id. at 38 ("State law has always provided the legal
backdrop against which national banks make real estate loans[.]").
101. See id. at 30-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress itself has never authorized
national banks to use subsidiaries incorporated under state law to perform traditional
banking functions .... The fact that it may have acquiesced in the OCC's expansive
interpretation of its authority is a plainly insufficient basis for finding preemption.");
12 C.F.R. § 7.4006; supra note 93 (explaining that the majority "reads in" that
operating subsidiaries are permitted under 12 U.S.C. § 24a).
102. Watters, 550 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[u]nlike Congress,
administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent the interests of States,
yet with relative ease they can promulgate comprehensive and detailed regulations
that have broad pre-emption ramifications for state law." (quoting Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000))).
103. See id. ("[T]he OCC's regulation may drive companies seeking refuge from
state regulation into the arms of federal parents, harm those state competitors who
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Cuomo, in contrast to Watters, did not directly involve the
preemption of a particular state law; rather, it involved the ability
of states to enforce their valid, non-preempted state banking laws
against national banks.'0" The Court revived Chevron analysis in
its opinion of the case.105
D. Cuomo v. Clearing House Association'0 6
In 2005, the Attorney General of New York State sent
letters to several national banks requesting private information
about their lending practices under threat of subpoena 7 to
determine if New York's fair lending laws had been violated.1 8
The Clearing House Association (CHA), a banking trade group,
and the OCC filed suit to help the banks avoid the release of
information to the attorney general.109
Respondents OCC and CHA argued that the OCC's
visitorial powers rule, which prohibited the states from enforcing
their own banking laws against national banks, correctly
interpreted the nineteenth-century NBA statute describing the
are not lucky enough to find a federal benefactor, and hamstring States' ability to
regulate the affairs of state corporations.")
104. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
105. See id.
106. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). Justice Scalia
authored the opinion for a five-four Court, in which Justice Thomas also wrote
dissenting in part and concurring in part. Id.
107. Id. at 2714. The non-public information sought by New York's attorney
general concerned whether lenders were engaging in discriminatory practices.
Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2007), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2710.
108. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a (2009). The statute
"broadly prohibits creditors from discriminating on the basis of sex, national origin,
or other protected grounds." Clearing House Ass'n, L.L. C., 510 F.3d 105, 109 n.3.
109. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714. "The Clearing House Association is the nation's
oldest bank association and forum." The Clearing House, The Clearing House
Association, http://www.theclearinghouse.org/reference/payments/070022.php (last
visited Jan. 17, 2010). Established in 1853, "it assemble[s] a small group of peer
executives to exchange information, make decisions, and carry out effective action on
issues of importance to the owner banks." Id. The Clearing House publishes both
comment letters and amicus curiae filings on behalf of association members. Id.
[Vol. 14
2010] CUOMO V. CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION 485
"visitorial powers" that apply to national banks. "0 The OCC
contended that the phrase "vested in the courts of justice" in the
statute refers to the inherent power of the courts to gather
information during litigation and does not reserve a state's right to
visitation.' These interpretations of "visitorial powers" and the
"courts of justice" exception would effectively preclude the states
from prosecuting law enforcement actions of non-preempted state
banking laws against national banks in state courts. 12
The Court framed the question presented as "whether the
[OCC's] regulation purporting to pre-empt state law enforcement
can be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the National Bank
Act.'01 3 The Court then acknowledged that normally "an agency's
reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with
administering" is given deference under Chevron."4 Because the
Court construed the term "visitorial powers" in the NBA statute
as ambiguous, it applied Chevron, stating that the OCC can give
"authoritative meaning to the statute within the bounds of th[e]
uncertainty.""' 5 It concluded under Chevron's Step Two that the
OCC's interpretation of "visitorial powers," which included
"ordinary enforcement of the law," was not permissible because
the interpretation exceeded "the outer limits of the term.
11 6
110. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714-15. The NBA's "visitorial powers" statute
reads as follows:
No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized
by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be, or
have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House
thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either House duly
authorized.
12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
111. See 12 U.S.C. § 484(a); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) (2009); Brief for Federal
Respondent at 8-9, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009)
(No. 08-453).
112. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718-21.
113. Id. at 2714-15.
114. Id. at 2715 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. et
al., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
115. Id. at 2715.
116. See id. at 2715; but see Merrill, supra note 16, at 23 (asserting that the majority
was unclear in its application of Chevron, acknowledging both that '"visitorial
authority' is ambiguous" and insisting "that the 'outer limits' of the meaning of that
term could be discerned 'through the clouded lens of history').
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Moreover, the Court declared that "[a]ny interpretation of
'visitorial powers' necessarily 'declares the pre-emptive scope of
the NBA,"' implying that the OCC created a new preemptive
authority for itself without Congressional mandate.117
According to the Court, precedent in First National Bank in
St. Louis v. Missouri'8 demonstrated that the Court had previously
viewed the rights of "visitation," or "the right to oversee corporate
affairs," as distinct from the power to enforce laws. " 9 The Court
also pointed to historical evidence to demonstrate that when the
NBA was written in 1864, "visitation" was regarded as only a
sovereign's ability to "examine into the affairs of," "inspect," or
C6120 -"control" a corporation. Considering that in Watters, the Court
described "visitation" as "the act of a superior or superintending
officer, [visiting] a corporation to examine into its manner of
conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and
regulations," the subsequent separation of law enforcement from
the term "visitorial powers" in Cuomo came as a surprise.21  But
the Cuomo majority found Watters as not inconsistent with its
position, because Watters only concerned the states' power to
generally supervise, oversee, and control national bank operating
subsidiaries and did not speak to the states' power to enforce their
non-preempted laws against them. Indeed, the Court referred to
as "bizarre" the states' inability to enforce their own valid and
non-preempted banking laws against national banks.12' Further,
the Court did not accept the Respondents' view of the "courts of
117. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721 (citation omitted).
118. First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 (1924).
119. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717 (citing First Nat'l Bank, 263 U. S. 640, which
"upheld the right of the Attorney General of Missouri to bring suit to enforce a state
anti-bank-branching law against a national bank"). "St. Louis is relevant to proper
interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) not because it is authoritative on the question
whether States can enforce their banking laws, but because it is one in a long and
unbroken line of cases distinguishing visitation from law enforcement." Id. at 2717
n.2.
120. Id. at 2716.
121. See id. at 2717; Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 14 (2007) (citing
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158 (1905)) (emphasis added).
122. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717.
123. Id. at 2718.
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justice" exception as prohibiting "normal civil and criminal
124lawsuits" in state courts.
The Court concluded that the OCC reasonably interpreted
the term "visitorial powers" to include "'conducting examinations
[and] inspecting or requiring the production of books or records of
national banks,'.. when the State conducts those activities in its
capacity as supervisor of corporations, 125  but that it was not
reasonable for the OCC to include "prosecuting enforcement
actions in state courts" as part of the term.126 The Court expressed
concern for the federalism implications of the OCC's regulation,
though it did not go so far as to invoke a "presumption against
preemption" as the Watters dissent advocated.127  The Cuomo
majority found, however, that the OCC's interpretation of
124. Id. ("[V]isitation was normally conducted through use of the prerogative
writs of mandamus and quo warranto. The exception could not possibly exempt that
manner of exercising visitation, or else the exception would swallow the rule. Its only
conceivable purpose is to preserve normal civil and criminal lawsuits.").
125. Id. at 2721 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009)).
126. See id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000). But compare Merrill, supra note 16, at
23:
Whether this was a [Chevron] "step one" decision, finding that the OCC had
exceeded the "clear" limits of the statute, a "step two" decision, finding
that the statute was ambiguous but the OCC's interpretation was
"unreasonable," or conceivably even a "step zero" decision, finding
that Chevron does not apply because the OCC had exceeded the
bounds of its delegated authority, was left completely obscure.
127. The Cuomo majority stated:
[T]he dissent concludes, this case does not raise the sort of federalism concerns
that prompt a presumption against pre-emption. We have not invoked
the presumption against pre-emption, and think it unnecessary to do so
in giving force to the plain terms of the National Bank Act. Neither,
however, should the incursion that the Comptroller's regulation makes
upon traditional state powers be minimized ....
The dissent seeks to minimize the regulation's incursion upon state powers by
claiming that the regulation does not "declare the pre-emptive scope of
the [National Bank Act]" but merely "interpret[s] the term 'visitorial
powers.'
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2720-21; see also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1,
32 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Consistent with our presumption against pre-
emption -- a presumption I do not understand the Court to reject -- I would read §
484(A) to reflect Congress' considered judgment not to preempt the application of
state visitorial laws to national bank 'affiliates."').
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"'visitorial powers' necessarily 'declar[ed] the pre-emptive scope
of the [National Bank Act][.]"" The Watters dissent
recommended that "when an agency purports to decide the scope
of federal pre-emption, a healthy respect for state sovereignty calls
for something less than Chevron deference, 1 29 but the Cuomo
majority instead used Chevron's Step Two to determine that the
OCC's interpretation of a legislative term was impermissible.'o
Despite the fact that the Chevron analysis came out in
favor of New York's attorney general, the Court ruled that a
request for information by the attorney general under threat of
subpoena did not constitute "the exercise of the power of law
131enforcement" in a court setting that the NBA contemplated.
The Court upheld the district court's injunction of the attorney
general's information request, but reversed the prohibition placed
on the attorney general "from bringing judicial enforcement
actions" against national banks. This decision makes it possible
for attorneys general, and perhaps state banking commissioners, to
obtain private information from national banks through formal
enforcement actions of non-preempted state laws.133 State officials
will, however, face challenges in obtaining information to assist in
investigations of national bank activities because most state
examination laws have been preempted either by the courts or by
the OCC's preemption rule.'3
128. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721 (citation omitted).
129. Watters, 550 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
130. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715 ("We can discern the outer limits of the term
'visitorial powers' even through the clouded lens of history. They do not include, as
the Comptroller's expansive regulation would provide, ordinary enforcement of the
law.").
131. Id. at 2722 ("That is not the exercise of the power of law enforcement 'vested
in the courts of justice' which 12 U.S.C. § 484(A) exempts from the ban on exercise of
supervisory power.").
132. Id.
133. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: A Crucial Victory for
the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, LOMBARD STREET, Aug. 17,
2009, at 15, http://www.finreg2l.com/lombard-street/cuomo-v-clearing-house-a-
crucial-victory-dual-banking-system-and-consumer-protection [hereinafter A Crucial
Victory].
134. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007, 7.4008, 7.4009, 34.4; Serious Threat, supra note 3, at
291; cf Robert A. Long & Keith A. Noreika, Cuomo v. Clearing House Association:
A Misguided Decision That Could Have Been Worse, LOMBARD STREET, Aug. 17,
2009, at 21, http://www.finreg2l.com/lombard-street/cuomo-v-clearing-house-
association-a-misguided-decision-that-could-have-been-worse ("While state authority
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The dissenting opinion in Cuomo, written by Justice
Thomas, considered "the only disputed question" to be "whether
the statutory term 'visitorial powers' is ambiguous and, if so,
whether OCC's construction of it is reasonable."'35  Thus, the
dissent also analyzed this case under Chevron's two-step
framework, finding ambiguity in the statutory term "vistorial
powers" and giving evidence for why the term is subject to
differing interpretations. 36 According to the dissent, as long as the
OCC's interpretation of an ambiguous term in the NBA is
reasonable, the Court should grant Chevron deference, "even if
the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the
best statutory interpretation.' ' 37  The dissent attempted to
establish that the common law history of the term "visitorial
powers" supports the sovereign's right to enforce laws against
"civil corporations," such as banks.3 8 Because the Court typically
defers to the "reasonable judgments of agencies with regard to the
meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are charged with
administering," the dissent contended that the OCC is entitled to
its interpretation of the relevant provision in the NBA for
purposes of formulating its regulations.'39
In the regulation at issue in Cuomo, the OCC interpreted
the term "visitorial powers" to allow itself to be the sole
governmental body that could enforce state fair lending or other
banking-related laws against national banks.' 4 In response to
Attorney General Cuomo's claim that the OCC interpreted
"visitorial powers" so as to preempt state laws, the dissent
to enforce non-preempted state laws against national banks is important and
consequential, it is distinct from the authority to impose substantive requirements
that prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of federal banking powers.").
135. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2723 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2722-23 ("In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes
within an agency's jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the
agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion." (quoting Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005))); id. at 2723-24
("OCC's interpretation of 'visitorial powers' . . . fits comfortably within this broad
dictionary definition of 'visitation[,]"' and "common-law tradition.., suggests that
visitorial powers were broader with respect to civil corporations, including banks.").
137. Id. at 2723 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980).
138. Id. at 2727.
139. Id. at 2723 (citing U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,229-30 (2001)), 2732-33.
140. Id. at 2715 (majority opinion); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a) (1-2) (2009).
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references Smiley, asserting that the attorney general is
"confus[ing] the question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-
emptive) meaning of a statute with the question of whether a
statute is pre-emptive.', 141  Moreover, to contest the majority's
claim that "any interpretation of 'visitorial powers' necessarily
'declares the preemptive scope of the NBA,' ' 142 the dissent wrote:
"a federal agency's construction of an ambiguous statutory term
may clarify the pre-emptive scope of enacted federal law, but that
fact alone does not mean that it is the agency, rather than
Congress, that has effected the pre-emption.' '4 3  The dissent
concluded under Chevron's Step Two that "[h]ere, the text,
structure, and history of 'visitorial powers' support the agency's
reasonable interpretation" of the NBA statute.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
These four cases show that the Supreme Court has offered
145varied levels of deference to OCC interpretations of the NBA.
VALIC and Smiley suggest that the Court is likely to grant
Chevron deference when federalism implications are not at issue.
' 46
In Watters, where federalism concerns were abundant, the Court
did not affirm the Sixth Circuit's decision by granting Chevron
deference. 4  Instead, the Court snubbed the ambiguities and
omissions in the NBA to find a clear Congressional purpose and
avoided applying Chevron. 48 Indeed, the Watters majority was
aware that Congress could not have contemplated the application
of the "vistorial powers" statute to operating subsidiaries of
141. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2732 (2009)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744
(1996)).
142. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721.
143. Id. at 2733.
144. Id.
145. See Merrill, supra note 16, at 25 (asserting that in Smiley, Watters, and
Cuomo, the Court offered very little guidance on how Chevron deference should
generally apply to preemptive agency interpretations of federal statutes).
146. See supra pp. 475-76, 478-79.
147. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20-21, 35-36 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
148. See id. at 20-21 (majority opinion).
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national banks when the statute was written in 1864.149 In that way,
granting Chevron deference based on the OCC's interpretation of
the statute is like granting the OCC a license to write preemptive
legislation.5 In Cuomo, the Court reaffirmed applying Chevron to
cases involving the OCC.151  Though the Cuomo majority did not
go as far as the Watters dissent had suggested, the high level of
deference granted to the OCC in Smiley has been tempered.' 52
Also, Cuomo puts in question the Court's former view in Smiley
that OCC regulations should not be scrutinized for whether they
are the "best" interpretations of NBA statutes, but rather, for their
reasonableness.' The Cuomo dissent, however, still embraces the
approach set out in Smiley.
5 4
149. See id. at 19 ("[O]ne cannot ascribe any intention regarding operating
subsidiaries to the 1864 Congress that enacted §§ 481 and 484 .... That is so because
operating subsidiaries were not authorized until 1966.").
150. Cf. id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("That Congress lavished such attention
on national bank affiliates and conferred such far-reaching authority on the OCC
without ever expanding the scope of § 484(A) speaks volumes about Congress' pre-
emptive intent, or rather its lack thereof.").
151. Cf. Long & Noreika, supra note 134, at 20 (arguing that "in Cuomo, the
Court did not alter the Chevron framework").
152. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715, 2720
(2009); Watters, 550 U.S. at 32, 41 (Stevens, J. dissenting); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996); Serious Threat, supra note 3, at 294; Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the
Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System
and Consumer Protection 54-55 (The Geo. Wash. U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper, No. 479), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1499216 [hereinafter Major Victory].
153. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715; Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744-45; Majority Victory,
supra note 152, at 54-55.
154. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2723 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)); id. at 2732
(citing Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744); Majority Victory, supra note 152, at 54-55. At this
point, the dynamics of the Court regarding the series of four cases discussed is worthy
of mention. Both Watters and Cuomo were closely decided. See supra notes 77, 106.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion in Watters and was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Breyer, and Alito (Justice Thomas did not take part). Watters, 550 U.S. 1. In
Cuomo, Justice Scalia wrote the five-four opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Souter,
Stevens, and Breyer joined. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710. Justice Ginsburg authored both
VALIC and Watters, though she joined with the majority in Cuomo. Id.; Watters, 550
U.S. 1; NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995). The author of Chevron, Justice Stevens, is now playing a role in softening the
analysis that he invented, exemplified by his dissent in Watters and his joining with
the majority in Cuomo. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710; Watters, 550 U.S. 1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. et al., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); c.f. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1190 (2009) ("Where, as here,
Congress has not authorized a federal agency to pre-empt state law directly, the
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Though at first glance Cuomo might seem like a rebuke of
the approach to Chevron used in Smiley, it is not likely that Smiley
would have been decided differently today."' The Smiley opinion
was unanimous, perhaps because the federalism implications of the
OCC's interpretation of the word "interest" were not as great as
the implications of its interpretation of the term "visitorial
powers" in Cuomo. The former would only preempt those state
laws disallowing national banks from charging certain fees on
accounts, whereas the latter has the potential to preempt the
enforcement of a whole host of state banking laws-particularly
those relating to consumer protection. Because the OCC has not
been known to eagerly enforce state laws against national banks, 
15 6
the Cuomo Court likely considered that granting Chevron
deference could potentially be too detrimental to a state's ability
117to effectively monitor businesses operating within its borders. In
other words, the Court seems to have indirectly expressed some of
the federalism concerns of the Watters dissent.1 8  Professor
Wilmarth attributes this about-face partially to the subprime
mortgage crisis which occurred after Watters was decided and prior
to the Cuomo decision.159 However, the Court was also likely
influenced by many of the federalism concerns expressed by Judge
Cardamone in his dissenting opinion for the Second Circuit.
160
weight this Court accords the agency's explanation of state law's impact on the
federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness."(citing
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944))). Justice Scalia's position is also
interesting, as he authored the opinion in Smiley, but took a dissenting position in
Watters and authored the opinion in Cuomo. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710; Watters, 550
U.S. 1; Smiley, 517 U.S. 735. It appears that he too believes that Chevron deference
should not have full force in situations where the OCC's interpretation of the NBA
can expand the preemptive scope of a federal statute and where federalism
implications are of a greater concern. See infra p. 492.
155. Cf Majority Victory, supra note 152, at 54-55 (stating that "Justice Scalia
essentially repudiated his prior reasoning in Smiley").
156. See Serious Threat, supra note 3, at 232 ("[D]uring the past decade the OCC
has not initiated a single public prosecution of a major national bank for violating a
consumer protection law.").
157. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721.
158. See id. at 2721; supra pp. 482-83 and notes 98, 102-03.
159. See Majority Victory, supra note 152, at 19.
160. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 127, 130-33 (2d Cir.
2007) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the OCC regulation should not
have been entitled to Chevron deference, as the "principal issue" on appeal was
federalism, the OCC visitorial powers regulation placed the Tenth Amendment "in
peril," and the regulation "erode[d] a key aspect of state sovereignty, confuse[d] the
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Another perspective applicable to this string of cases is that
"the Roberts Court seems to be moving away from Chevron (even
when its opinions cite it) and back to the earlier Skidmore test...
call[ing] for a case-by-case, facts-and-circumstances review of
agency interpretation[.] ' ' 161 Professor Thomas Merrill argues that
Watters and Cuomo were decided "without giving anything more
than Skidmore deference" to the OCC. 162 Still, the Supreme Court
did not discard the Chevron analysis all together; 63 rather, it said
that "the presence of some uncertainty does not expand Chevron
deference to cover virtually any interpretation of the NBA."'' 6 By
this, the Court likely meant that in certain situations, e.g. when
federalism concerns are greater, it would be more critical in its
analysis to determine if an OCC interpretation of the NBA is
reasonable.
With respect to the OCC's 2004 preemption rules, the
approach to Chevron in Cuomo should be followed going forward.
Hence, a court should be more critical in its Chevron analysis if an
OCC interpretation of the NBA in the 2004 preemption rules
seems to broaden the scope of preemption and potentially shut out
a wide range of state banking or consumer protection laws from
paths of political accountability, and allow[ed] a federal regulatory agency to have a
substantial role in shaping state public policy"); see also Major Victory, supra note
152, at 37 n.155 (referring to Judge Cardamone's dissent).
161. Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give to
State Agency Interpretation?, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1108-09 (2008). See generally
Skidmore et al. v. Swift. Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944):
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
162. Merrill, supra note 16, at 26.
163. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009)
(beginning the opinion with "the familiar Chevron framework"); cf. Long & Noreika,
supra note 134, at 20 (arguing that "[in Cuomo, the Court did not alter the Chevron
framework").
164. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715.
165. See Cuomo, 129 S.Ct. at 2715 (proceeding to "discern the outer limits of the
term 'visitorial powers' even through the clouded lens of history."); id. at 2720-21.
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applying to national banks. On the other hand, if the scope of
preemption is broadened, as in Smiley, but the potentially affected
state consumer protection laws have a more limited range, a court
can be more deferential to the OCC in conducting its Chevron
analysis. To some extent, this approach relieves the concern that
the OCC's preemption standard of "obstruct, impair, or condition"
may be more preemptive of state laws than the former Barnett
Bank standard of "significantly interfere."' 66  It has now been
tempered by the Supreme Court's Chevron methodology in cases
where the scope of preemption is affected and federalism concerns
are greater.167
RAMYN ATRI
166. See supra pp. 470-72.
167. But compare Preemption of State Law Enforcement, supra note 16, at 331:
In Cuomo, a more sensitive application of Chevron would have surveyed the
historical sources and possible interpretations and recognized that
reasonable judicial minds differ on the ambiguity question. Thus, the
discerning judge would recognize that an opinion phrased entirely in terms
of reconstructing the meaning of "visitorial powers" (such as the Cuomo
opinions) would be overly contentious, in light of Chevron deference, and
lose persuasive force. The bulk of the opinion would instead consist of a
consideration of the functional federalism factors indicated, and whether
the OCC's interpretation was reasonable in light of these factors.
Professor Wilmarth advocates a "four part test" in approaching preemption cases:
First, Chevron deference is inapplicable absent an explicit delegation of preemptive
rulemaking authority to the agency. In his opinions in Watters and Wyeth,
Justice Stevens indicated that a federal agency's preemptive regulation
should not receive Chevron deference unless Congress has expressly
granted preemptive rulemaking power to the agency ....
Second, no deference should be given to agency interpretations of statutes, judicial
precedents and other legal authorities that do not require specialized
agency expertise ....
Third, "some weight" may be given to an agency's expert analysis of the ways in
which state laws conflict with the statutory scheme administered by the
agency, but courts should carefully scrutinize agency claims of "obstacle"
preemption ....
Fourth, a presumption against preemption applies whenever an agency seeks to
preempt a traditional state function.
Major Victory, supra note 152, at 36-44 (citations and underlining omitted).
